Assessing Missteps and Future Trajectory for US Foreign Policy in Asia
By Kelly Roberson
Over the past twenty years, consecutive missteps in addressing China’s rise as a global superpower have rendered the United States’ Asian strategy defective. Haphazard adjustments from Soviet-style containment to direct blunting by American administrations have eroded goodwill and alienated potential allies. The United States must establish a functional long-term mission that can balance China’s influence, reassure allies, and avoid alienating non-aligned states in South and Southeast Asia. Otherwise, the US risks losing regional relevance, and accelerating its decline into the “sick man” of the region.
The failure of the US to implement a cohesive platform is due to consistently overlooking China’s emergence as a global superpower–a bellwether for a broader geopolitical metamorphosis in the Indo-Pacific. Presently, six Indo-Pacific countries are considered high-income; within twenty-five years this is projected to rise to eleven. Consequently, this will shift the Asian Indo-Pacific global GDP contributions from an estimated 31.5% to 41.2%. The region would hold a majority of the world’s population and be equipped for en masse consumption. Any country aspiring to be a global superpower in the future must maintain political and diplomatic favor in the region.
The US’s influence in Asia has been waning since the 2007 financial crisis and China’s subsequent ascendancy as the second largest economy. Since then, China’s strategy has pursued a line of advantage, visible in the “9-dash-line” – China claiming heritage rights over the entirety of the South China Sea due to prior control in the Imperial era. The underlying issue is that the 9-dash-line compromises half a dozen countries’ modern-day sovereign waters. The Obama administration foresaw China’s increased presence as an imminent concern to US interests and announced a pivot to the Pacific in 2009. In 2013, concerns materialized following several Sino-Japanese disputes over the Diaoyu-Senkaku islands, which resulted in China declaring the territory as part of its Air Defense Identification Zone. Additionally, China began construction on artificial-islands throughout the South China Sea. Despite increased tensions, the US did little to quell allies’ concerns beyond modest troop movements to pre-existing bases, and most non-aligned cooperation dissipating. The US’s attempt to contain China was perceived as passive by allies, pushing many to question Washington’s willingness to commit to the Pacific.
The first Trump administration attempted to course correct and offset China’s growing influence by using hawkish rhetoric, large tariffs on Chinese products, and military mobilization in Asia. These changes imposed real economic costs upon China; however, the confrontational style cast the US as an erratic power flailing a loaded gun in a crowded room. Some regional allies were placated, but non-aligned states became fearful that US aggression would destabilize the region by provoking China. Ultimately, the first Trump administration failed to account for the growing importance of non-aligned states who began building partnerships with China.
The Biden administration attempted to correct this oversight and sought collective engagement through institution building and expanding trade among non-aligned states. This approach emphasized reinvesting in Southeast Asia, mobilizing alliances through organizations such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and AUKUS – a trilateral military arrangement between Australia, the UK, and the US, – while deepening participation in regional institutions like the Asian Regional Forum (ARF). Rather than returning to Obama-era containment or Trump-era blunting, the Biden administration pursued strategic hedging to counter Chinese investments, while expanding cooperative dialogue with regional actors. This strategy had potential to establish a durable trajectory; however, it also required time and patience before results could materialize.
In Trump’s second term, the administration acknowledged the importance of regional economic networks, particularly in middle-income states in Southeast Asia. Yet instead of building upon Biden-era frameworks, it doubled-down on imposing sweeping wholesale tariffs across Asia. Non-aligned state governments that once worried about US policies indirectly disrupting regional trade networks, now faced a US government willing to directly undermine markets when trade agreements were perceived unfavorably. The approach fundamentally misunderstands the region, by assuming the non-aligned countries will placate the US due to its superpower status.
If the U.S seeks to remain a participant in the region, it must utilize a multifaceted approach that promotes strategic Foreign Direct Investment, reduces barriers to joint economic and security partnerships, and expands education and work-study migration from Asia. Numerous regional organizations already exist to support political and economic exchange, but most rely on trade agreements and informal commitments—tools that have lost credibility after two decades of US inconsistency.
Rebuilding trust in the region requires the US to target developmental gaps with strategic investments and institution-building. Washington could integrate into domestic economies by establishing structured loan commitments, and diversifying production and supply chains. The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework initiated these steps by leveraging organizations such as the Association for Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the ARF to promote regional development, extending US influence while countering Chinese capital investments.
This approach does raise legitimate questions of feasibility. Logistical success rests upon the US imposing self-restraint without an apparent incentive. Additionally, there is a moral question of whether the US maintains any right to economically re-insert itself into countries; particularly those it manipulated in the past. However, the US faces an existential crisis of being replaced within the region; it must selectively sacrifice its unilateral control in the interim if it seeks to retain influence in the long-run. Chinese militarism and predatory financial practices are already forming new hegemonic institutions. Through bolstering impartial and non-affiliated organizations, the US could develop a long-term foothold in the region by encouraging egalitarianism among states.
The remaining limitations of the policy require the creation of institutional guardrails that bind the US to its commitments; otherwise, partners will remain hesitant to trust any promise past the active administration. The creation of an economic network with greater mutual trading arrangements – that operate under active tariffs and fees — alongside temporary collective membership disengagement penalties may incentivize prolonged cooperation. Addressing present gaps in trust is necessary to build dynamic relationships with active and potential partners. Without greater accountability, that appears unfeasible in the long-run.
If the US fails to establish a coherent strategy in Asia, the region may provide a forecast for American decline. China doesn’t fear retaliation, and Washington lacks feasible tools it can deploy. The world is moving toward multipolarity, where regional blocs and trade networks will wield greater leverage. The era of uncontested American hegemony has passed. Unless the US adapts to this reality by building lasting and credible partnerships in Asia, the region — and the world — will move on without it.
Author’s Bio
Kelly Roberson is a first-year dual-degree student pursuing a Master of Public Policy and a Master of Science at the University of Michigan, with concentrations in International Economic Development and Environmental Policy. His research focuses on sustainable development strategies for enhancing energy and water security in the Indo-Pacific region. In this article, he examines the trajectory of U.S. strategic engagement in Asia over the past two decades and proposes analytical frameworks to inform future regional development.
Editors: Gautham Sharma/ MPP’26, Jiseon Kim/ MPP’27
