Gangs, Democracy, and Critical Supply Chains. What is next for Haiti?
With elections nearing and organized gangs controlling key supply routes, Haiti faces four possible futures. The best-case scenario is that elections occur and the newly national government successfully thwarts the gang’s efforts in controlling the supply chains, further legitimizing their power in Haiti. Alternatively, if the gangs interfere with elections, the United Nations (UN) could still restore key supply routes, offering partial success for the people of Haiti who have been negatively impacted by the gang violence and lack of elected government. Another possibility is elections occurring with gang interference. This would leave the power dynamics of the gangs controlling the supply routes and control of vital infrastructure in Haiti unchanged. The worst case scenario is elections do not take place and gangs remain in control – a scenario that seems very likely given Haiti’s history and weak governance system. For reference, Haiti has seen close to 30 coups in its history of gaining independence since 1804.
Gang violence and corruption has surged in Haiti since 2016. Following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021 and resignation of Prime Minister Ariel Henry in 2024, the two largest gang alliances – G9 and G-Pép – formed a coalition and seized control of much of Port-au-Prince. These gangs are very political in nature and rely on the corruption of politicians and weak governance structures to tighten their grip on Haiti’s critical infrastructure.
While an interim transitional government council was formed after the resignation of Prime Minister Henry, there has been no formally elected leader which has allowed for the new coalition of gang members to fill this void and hold the nation hostage, given their control of the critical supply routes in and out of the country. As a result, gangs now dominate supply routes, worsening the humanitarian crisis causing famine, death, and displacement. According to the International Migration Organization, 94% of those displaced are women and girls. The crisis in Haiti is severe. Due to the violence, close to 30 hospitals shut their doors in 2024. According to UNICEF, severe acute malnutrition has risen by 30% since 2022, which translates to close to 3 million children being severely malnourished.
Gangs have closed major air traffic control centers, restricted seaports, and regularly patrols roads. This has led to 5,000,000 people being without access to essentials, including food, clean water, and medication. This lack of access has indirectly caused 5,500 deaths in 2024. Additionally, given the gangs expanding influence into rural communities, individuals are now unable to access polling stations if and when elections are held due to road closures and intimidation tactics.
Haiti’s two hoped-for turning points are the UN’s long-awaited, Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission which has already deployed and the proposed February 2026 elections. Both are paths to reestablish a legitimate government, restoring control of critical supply chain routes and rebuilding public trust in Haiti’s democratic processes. Two uncertainties remain. Will Haiti hold a free and fair election? Will gangs cede control of the country’s key infrastructure and trade routes? Let’s explore four scenarios that take into account these two uncertainties for the future fate of Haiti.
Scenario 1: A New Day in Haiti
In the best case scenario, a free, fair 2026 election, would lead to a strengthening in law enforcement, a long debated issue that has led to an underfunded and under-resourced force, allowing the newly elected government to implement policies aimed at weakening gang influence and reestablishing the rule of law. If the gangs cede control and allow aid and necessities to reach those in need, it could help restore Haitians’ trust in their government. Successful elections would lead to the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) initiatives which could stabilize Haiti through the transition of gang members to civilian life. However, gang resistance remains a risk. Gangs are far more political than most criminal organizations as there are deep ties both financial and otherwise between law enforcement, politicians and the gang network. Given their power and control of key roads and expanding influence in the rural areas of Haiti, ensuring voter access to elections is a major concern.
Scenario 2: UN Success
If elections are delayed or do not occur in February 2026, then the Multinational Security Support can intervene to effectively reduce gang violence and regain control of the key access points. Through increased funding and international support, the newly heavily armed MSS Mission could ensure that humanitarian relief is able to flow into the country. The goals of the UN’s MSS Mission is to stabilize the country amid a deteriorating humanitarian crisis through sustained engagement with Haitians and prioritizing creating an environment for free fair elections.
With gang violence and suppression under control, elections could be planned, free from interference, and immediate relief and aid would be able to flow into Port-au-Prince. However, achieving their goals would require increased and sustained funding from the UN to the MSS Mission. Given the difficulty in securing the authorization to send the MSS Mission from Kenya who supplied many of the personnel to Haiti, it is unlikely that this entity would have the willpower, resources, and support to retake control of Haiti’s supply chain. Finally, MSS Mission’s 800 personnel are severely outnumbered compared to the 12,000 gang members, making sustained security unpredictable and difficult.
Scenario 3: Elected but Limited
In this scenario, elections are held in February 2026, as planned. However, given the political influence of the gangs, they are not free or fair, and the new government would not make any changes in policies that would negatively impact the gangs’ control. Elections in this future would not weaken gang control, keeping supply chains hostage. This level of control has made the gangs in Haiti relatively economically autonomous. An example of this is there are companies that pay close to $20,000 per week to the gangs for any containers coming into Haiti. As a result, necessities such as food and medicine would remain blocked from reaching Haitians, leading to an increase in the humanitarian crisis. The public, realizing the elections have failed to bring peace and stability, would continue to lose trust in the government as their daily situation has not improved since the elections were held. Additionally, given the tenuous relationship between the two gang coalitions of G9 and G-Pép, once a new government is elected, it is unclear if the alliance between these two gangs would remain. This could result in even greater instability as the coalition could fracture, leading to an inter-gang dispute. Inter-gang conflict would heighten instability in Haiti and pose serious risks to civilians caught in the crossfire.
Scenario 4: Democracy Fails
The worst case scenario is elections do not occur, the MSS Mission fails to secure Haiti and minimize the negative impacts of the gangs, the security situation will inevitably further deteriorate. With no checks, the gangs would consolidate power even further and Haiti’s famine and displacement would worsen. Haiti’s weak political system that is susceptible to corruption, influence, and fear is only reinforced in this future. This scenario effectively marks the end of Haiti as a functional state, with gangs replacing government institutions. It would embolden the gang coalition to fill the power vacuum left by the lack of an elected leader. Jimmy Chérizier, the leader of the gang coalition uses revolutionary language stating they want “to see another Haiti.”. This suggests a shift to a paramilitary rule where gang leaders are de facto warlords. However, with the humanitarian crisis worsening, this aid blockage could spark civilian uprisings, however given the capabilities of the citizenry of Haiti compared to the gangs, this would likely not pose a legitimate risk to the gangs.
Haiti’s fate depends on elections and whether the gangs will cede power. Given the power dynamics, Haiti’s electoral history, including 28 coups dating back since its independence in 1804, and the lack of decisive action from Haitian leaders and the international community, Scenario 4—Democracy Fails: Gang Control Continues—appears to be the most likely future.
Biography of Author
Gabriel Otis is currently an M.A. candidate at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, specializing in security policy studies. In addition to his academic work, he serves as the Director of Development & External Relations at a non-governmental organization in Connecticut. Gabriel has previously held roles at George Mason University’s National Security Institute, the New Zealand Ministry of Defence, and the Hawaii House of Representatives. In this article, he examines four potential futures for Haiti, shaped by two key uncertainties: whether Haiti will hold free and fair elections, and whether gangs will relinquish control of the country’s critical infrastructure and trade routes.
Edited by: Cara Clay, MPP ’26 // Kate Lyons, MPP ’26
